QEMU QCow2 built-in encryption: just say no. Deprecated now, to be deleted soon

Posted: March 17th, 2015 | Author: | Filed under: Coding Tips, Fedora, libvirt, OpenStack, Security | Tags: , , | 6 Comments »

A little over 5 years ago now, I wrote about a how libvirt introduced support for QCow2 built-in encryption. The use cases for built-in qcow2 encryption were compelling back then, and remain so today. In particular while LUKS is fine if your disk backend is already a kernel visible block device, it is not a generically usable alternative for QEMU since it requires privileged operation to set it up, would require yet another I/O layer via a loopback or qemu-nbd device, and finally is entirely Linux specific. The direction QEMU has taken over the past few years has in fact been to take the kernel out of the equation for more & more functionality. For example, QEMU can now natively connect to RBD, Gluster, iSCSI and NFS servers with no kernel assistance – the client code is implemented entirely within QEMU block driver layer, which precludes the use of LUKS there.

At the time I wrote that blog post, no one had seriously looked at the QCow2 encryption design to see if it was in any way sane from a security POV. At least if they had, AFAIK, they didn’t make their analysis public. Over time though, various QEMU maintainers did eventually look at the QCow2 encryption code and their conclusions were not positive. The consensus opinion amongst QEMU maintainers today is that QCow2 encryption is terminally flawed in a number of serious ways, including but not limited to:

  • The AES-CBC cipher is used with predictable initialization vectors based on the sector number. This makes it vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks which can reveal the existence of encrypted data.
  • The user passphrase is directly used as the encryption key.
    • A poorly chosen or short passphrase will compromise the security of the encryption.
    • In the event of the passphrase being compromised there is no way to change the passphrase to protect data in any qcow images.
    • It is difficult to make the data permanently inaccessible upon file deletion – at best you can try to destroy data with shred, though even this is ineffective with many modern storage technologies.

By comparison the LUKS encryption format does not suffer from any of these problems. With LUKS the initialization vectors typically use ESSIV to ensure unpredictability; the passphrase is only indirectly used to unlock the master encryption key material, so can be changed at will; the passphrase is put through a PBKDF2 function to mitigate the effects of short sequences of letters; the size of the master key material is artificially inflated with an anti-forensic algorithm to increase the difficulty of recovering the key from deleted volumes.

The QCow2 encryption scheme is a prime example of why merely using a well known standard algorithm (AES) is not sufficient to guarantee a secure implementation. In January 2014, I submitted an update for the QEMU docs to explicitly warn users about the security limitations of QCow2 encryption, which made it into the 1.5.0 release of QEMU. This week Markus has gone one step further and explicitly deprecated use of QCow2 encryption for the forthcoming 2.3.0 release of QEMU. Any attempt to use an encrypted QCow2 file with the QEMU system emulator will now result in a warning being printed to stderr, which in turn ends up in the libvirt logfile for that guest. As well as the security issues, Markus’ other motivation for deprecating this is that the way it is integrated into QEMU block driver layer causes a number of technical & usability problems. So even if we want encrypted block devices in QEMU, the internals for encryption need a complete rewrite from scratch.

In the 2.4.0 release, the intention is to go one step further and actually delete support for QCow2 encryption from the QEMU system emulator entirely, as well as all the infrastructure for block device encryption. We will keep support for decrypting images in the qemu-img program only, to provide a way for users to get their previously encrypted data out into a supported format.

In the immediate future, the recommendation is that users who need encryption for virtual disks should use LUKS on the host, despite the limitations that I noted earlier. At some point in the next 6 months my intention is to start working on a QEMU block driver implementation of the LUKS format, which will enable QEMU to add encryption to any of its virtual disk backends, not merely QCow2. This will require designing new infrastructure for handling decryption keys inside QEMU too, to replace the unsatisfactory approach used today. By using the LUKS format directly though, QEMU will benefit from the security knowledge of those who designed and analysed this format over many years to identify its strengths & weaknesses. It will also provide good interoperability. eg an encrypted qcow2-luks file will be able to be converted to/from a block device for access by the kernel’s LUKS driver with no need to re-encrypt the data, which is very desirable as it lets users decide whether to use in-QEMU or in-kernel block device backends at the flick of a switch.

So just to sum up. Do not ever use QCow2 built-in encryption as it exists today. It is unfixably broken by design. It is deprecated in QEMU 2.3.0 and is likely to be deleted in QEMU 2.4.0.

6 Comments

John Moran said at 3:48 pm on September 4th, 2015:

Hello, thanks for heads up on qemu encryption. I am researching methods for supporting encrypting/decrypting client data when storing on disk. We are using KVM/qemu. Is there any progress on developing QEMU block driver supporting LUKS format?

Thanks
Jack Moran

Daniel Berrange said at 4:03 pm on September 4th, 2015:

No active work done yet, but it is something I intend to work on over the next 6 months. In the meantime people are best off using dm-crypt/luks

Andrea Cascio said at 2:52 pm on September 11th, 2015:

QCOW2 encryption is mainly used to distribute encrypted VMs with some sensible data inside, which libvirt should be able to automatically start once you provide the passphrase to the user.

I can’t see how the same target can be achieved with dm-crypt/luks without very ugly kludges.

I’m ok with QCOW2 encryption being deprecated with big bad warnings. Even better if it gets reworked.
But I think a plain removal is a big mistake, as long as no other viable alternative is available. Unfortunately, dm-crypt/luks is very good, but it does not simply achieve the same targets.

Thanks
Andrea

Daniel Berrange said at 2:57 pm on September 11th, 2015:

If you’re distributing VM images which contain sensitive data, then you should encrypt them using PGP or some other strong encryption standard, and then decrypt when deploying the luks partition.

Andrea Cascio said at 12:22 pm on September 14th, 2015:

This require, on the installer’s side, more work than simply “put VM and passphrase in your libvirt GUI”. And, BTW, luks partitions means no unattended reboots, which is a real PITA.
Like I said, there’s no real alternative.

Felipe Arroso said at 7:13 pm on January 14th, 2018:

There does not seem to be a single example on the internets explaining how to convert and old encrypted image to a new unencrypted one which the new qemu can boot.

The qemu-img convert command line manual is utterly cryptic, and how to specify the password is basically impossible to infer.

Adding an example somewhere (e.g. in the error message you get when trying to boot an encrypted image) would be *really* helpful.

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